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CAPTURE AND COUNTERACTION: SELF-HELP BY
ENVIRONMENTAL ZEALOTS
James E. Krier*
I. THE MEANING OF SELF-HELP
Self-help is a largely neglected topic in American legal stud-
ies.' With the exception of a survey by a group of law students
published a dozen years ago,2 there appears to be little, if any-
thing, in our legal literature that confronts the subject in a
systematic way.3 This is so, at least, if one defines self-help as
I do. To me, the term refers to any act of bypassing the formal
legal system in order to get what one wants.
Lest this meaning seem obvious, notice that there are alter-
native definitions of self-help that view it more narrowly. One
of these alternatives defines self-help to mean what it means in
the large and familiar range of popular self-help books and
articles that offer "how-to" guidance on matters ranging from
the mundane to the metaphysical: how to do your own plumb-
ing, how to be your own best friend, and so on. If we were to
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School. An earlier
version of this essay was presented as the George E. Allen Lecture at the T.C. Wil-
liams School of Law, University of Richmond, during my week-long visit to the school
as the George E. Allen Professor in March 1996. I am grateful to the Allen family,
and to the students, staff, and faculty of the law school-Professor Michael Allan
Wolf in particular-for hospitality and support. Research assistance was provided by a
cluster of people during their time as students at the University of Michigan Law
School. My thanks especially to Daniel Ginsberg, Eric Guidry, Stephen Ross, Kevin
Toh, and Donald Wiest.
1. In contrast to the situation with respect to American law, there are a number
of studies of self-help written in other languages and focused on other legal cultures.
I have not consulted these for purposes of the present essay, but I intend to consider
them in connection with the larger work of which this essay is a part.
2. See, Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in
Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845 (1984).
3. But see Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest,
14 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1971). Posner's article, despite its rather limited substantive
reach, approaches the question of self-help in a way that illuminates the general
subject, as I shall try to show.
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define self-help in this way, we would find a raft of legal liter-
ature offering instruction on the preparation of one's taxes, the
making of one's will, the filing of one's lawsuit, the dissolution
of one's marriage, and so on, by and for oneself.4 But this gen-
re is concerned only with the relatively limited question of self-
help that bypasses lawyers, whereas I am concerned with the
very broad matter of self-help that bypasses the formal legal
system entirely.
Another definition of self-help gets closer to the broad concep-
tion but still manages to fall short, and in a way that proves to
be instructive. An example is found in the Oxford English Dic-
tionary, which, under the term "self-help," has an entry that
reads: "Law. Redress of one's wrongs by one's own action, with-
out recourse to legal process."5 The shortcoming of this defini-
tion is its focus on the righting of wrongs. Self-help in its full-
est and most significant sense entails substantially more than
that, a point I can explain by reference to the rule of capture,
which happens to be one of my central concerns in this essay.
II. SELF-HELP AND THE RULE OF CAPTURE
The rule of capture is quite clearly a self-help rule, yet it has
nothing to do with redressing wrongs. Under the rule, which re-
mains a significant feature of American law despite judicial and
legislative modifications over the years,6 so-called fugitive or
freely roaming natural resources are, while in their natural
state, owned in common by members of the community at large.
They remain common property until someone "captures" them
by reducing them to individual possession and control, at which
point they typically become that person's private property.
The rule of capture is of ancient origin. It probably originated
in the context of wild animals-animals ferae naturae is the
4. See, e.g., FRANK G. HOUDEK, LAW FOR THE LAYMAN: AN ANNOTATED BiBLIOG-
RAPHY OF SELF-HELP LAW BOOKS (1991). Houdek's book is a loose-leaf volume, so
obviously a lot of future entries are anticipated.
5. 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 922 (2d ed. 1989).
6. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 20-62 (3d ed.
1991) (discussing various aspects of the rule of capture). Some of the ideas explored
in the present essay were first suggested in the cited pages of the Dukeminier &
Krier course book.
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pretentious legal term-that were hunted for food and other
domestic purposes: waterfowl and other wild birds valued for
their flesh or plumage; rabbits, mink and deer; fish and whales.
Whales provide a good example of the rule of capture in opera-
tion. A whale loose in the open ocean essentially belongs to
everybody entitled to fish the waters-it is common proper-
ty-whereas a whale fast to a whaling ship belongs, as private
property, to the whaler that caught it.' Capture might be liter-
al (which is to say "actual"-the whale is harpooned and tied
fast to the boat), or figurative ("constructive," as lawyers put
it-the whale has been mortally wounded by a harpoon from a
pursuing whaler). The general point is apparent: When an ani-
mal ferae naturae is killed or caught, or as good as killed or
caught, it belongs to the predator who did it in, so long as
pursuit of the animal has not been abandoned.8
The rule of capture was extended early on from wild animals
to other resources which, though they lack a life of their own,
nevertheless roam about. An example is groundwater, found in
pools and streams beneath vast stretches of surface land owned
as relatively small individual plots by any number of people.
Under the applicable rule (since modified to some degree in
some jurisdictions), each owner of overlying land had the right
to drill down through his land in order to extract ("capture")
the water. All of the landowners were in competition with each
other.9 No one landowner had the right to exclude the others
from taking water by digging wells that started on, and bot-
tomed under, their own land. The water was common property
until reduced to individual possession and control, at which
point it, like a whale on a line, became private property.
7. "A Fast-Fish belongs to the party fast to it," as one respected authority put
the matter. "A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it."
HERAiAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK ch. 89 (Harrison Hayford & Hershel Parker eds.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1967) (1851).
8. Under the rule of capture, an animal that subsequently escapes into the wild
is usually once again ferae naturae, common property up for grabs. See, e.g., RAY
ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 18 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed.,
3d ed. 1975).
9. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 6, at 4041. Under the early common
law rule, each owner of land over an aquifer was entitled to draw freely from the
source. The rule "was in reality a rule of capture... ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS ch. 41, commentary at 256 (1977).
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Likening water beneath the surface of the earth to whales
beneath the surface of the ocean would probably strike lay
observers as a remarkably odd thing to do. But we can expect
that most people, once introduced to the legal conception behind
the analogy, would regard the leap from whales to water as
perfectly natural and utterly logical. (Whether it was also wise
is a separate question that I shall take up eventually.) And
given the likening of water roaming free to wild animals roam-
ing free, it is not surprising to learn that judges subsequently
-extended the notion to still other fugitive resources when man-
kind happened upon them and found them worth exploiting. So
oil and gas, according to a judicial opinion from the late nine-
teenth century, "may be classed by themselves, if the analogy
be not too fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae."0 As with
groundwater, an owner of land over a common pool of oil or gas
could try to capture the resources-make them private proper-
ty-by drilling wells down through his or her own land, but
each landowner over the pool was in competition with all the
others over the pool, who had the same rights to drill. The
remedy of each as against others alleged to be taking amounts
beyond their own shares was to "go and do likewise."1 All
were to help themselves.
III. THE NATURE OF SELF-HELP
The rule of capture demonstrates that self-help is not just
about redressing wrongs. Under the rule, people are privileged
to capture (or try to capture) fugitive resources not because
anybody is "in the wrong," but rather because all have the right
to engage in a competitive process whereby resources held in
common are transformed into resources held as private proper-
ty. This process was not, and is not, the only way the matter
could be addressed. It could as well have been, for example,
that the owners of land overlying common pool resources were
required by the state to get some sort of permit in order to
extract water or oil or gas, and the terms of the permit could
have set the amount each was entitled to take. Indeed, roughly
10. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa.
1889).
11. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907).
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this sort of program eventually became the standard approach
to the matter. 2
The legal history of common-pool resources in the United
States generally illustrates two points about self-help. First,
bypassing the formal legal system in order to get what one
wants might be privileged, 13 but it might also be outlawed.
Even during its heyday, for example, the rule of capture did not
entitle one landowner to help himself to what another had
already reduced to possession and control. If A captured oil and
stored it in a tank, B was not privileged to go and siphon it off,
even if B had been privileged to capture the oil before A in the
first place.'4 Second, acts of self-help that were once privileged
might subsequently be made illicit, in light of changing circum-
stances. For example, the rule of capture was changed in vari-
ous respects by the introduction of the permit systems men-
tioned above.
The law of self-help is chiefly concerned with considering
which acts of bypassing the formal legal system are to be privi-
leged, which are not, and why. Notice that we could imagine a
regime where no such acts are permitted, where all self-help is
illegitimate, and where, in order to be entitled to do anything,
one would have to enlist the aid and apparatus of the state, or
at least get the state's explicit permission. Drawing a breath
could be regulated, just as withdrawing oil is; exhaling could be
subject to legislative control-and is, when the source is not
somebody's lungs but somebody's factory.
The example of regulated respiration strikes us as silly, of
course, but only because it would be silly, for any number of
reasons, to regulate breathing. Nevertheless, however foolhardy
it would be in practice, it is possible in principle. This is so for
innumerable instances of legitimate self-initiative and privileged
self-help, instances that we take for granted as part of a preor-
dained natural order only because some kinds of self-help are
12. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 6, at 54.
13. Indeed, beyond being privileged it might be subsidized, as in the case of
bounty hunting for money awards provided by the state.
14. For a time, at least, B was entitled to siphon off the oil captured by A if A
stored it not in a tank, but rather by reinjecting it into a depleted pool under the
land of A and B. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 6, at 39.
19961 1043
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so sensible and deeply normalized that we have no reason to
imagine controlling them--even though, if we did have reason
to imagine controlling them, we could.
Take the planting of crops for consumption by one's own
household and livestock. Home gardening seems an innocent
and very productive kind of self-help, utterly in accord with a
healthy natural order. Yet it is also a kind of self-help that has
hardly gone unbridled. Zoning and other laws govern horticul-
ture in many areas, and some kinds of crops are controlled, or
even prohibited altogether. Regarding prohibition, I have in
mind not weed but wheat, the growing of which was regulated
by the federal government during World War II. In Wickard v.
Filburn,5 the Supreme Court upheld a legislative provision
that extended a regulatory program "to production not intended
in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the
farm," 6 even though this necessarily resulted in "forcing some
farmers into the market to buy what they could provide for
themselves .. .17
If farmers had been permitted to provide for themselves, they
would have done so whenever they regarded that as a less
costly alternative than purchase in the market (or going with-
out). And to say this is just to note a specific example of the
general advantage of self-help to those who think they can take
care of themselves.
In the legal context, for example, the benefit of bypassing
lawyers is that one saves lawyers' fees (though at the cost of
the chance that the lay person will perform less effectively than
the law person). The advantage of bypassing not just lawyers,
but the formal legal system altogether, is similar: The legal
system is rather inert and expensive to move or change. If in a
contest between me and another, I am entitled to bypass the
legal system in a way that forces my opponent to resort to it,
then the burden of inertia is in my favor, and this is a consid-
erable benefit to me (although there is once again a cost to me
as well, measured in terms of the possibility that working
through the system would have proved to be the best way for
15. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
16. Id. at 118.
17. Id. at 129.
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me to get what I wanted). We can say with utter confidence
that people who engage in any kind of self-help must regard
their actions as beneficial on balance; otherwise they would not
help themselves.
IV. INTERFERENCE WITH CAPTURE: TWO OLD CASES
Self-help privileges, therefore, are not part of an immutable
natural order, they are instead mutable social construc-
tions-the flipside of the formal legal system-and self-help
always has costs and benefits. The private costs and benefits of
self-help have just been suggested above. The social costs and
benefits turn on what society gains by privileging certain acts
of self-help, on the one hand, and what society loses by doing
so, on the other. Just as private calculation will influence
people's decisions about what actions to take for themselves,
social calculation will (or should) influence the state's decisions
about what actions people are privileged to take for themselves.
For example, depending on circumstances, and changes in cir-
cumstances, the state might privilege some kinds of self-help at
first, then later disallow them (and vice versa); it might allow
certain self-help measures and, at the same time, privilege
others that counter those allowed (as in "go and do likewise");
it might ban altogether certain kinds of self-help (outlawing "an
eye for an eye").
It is in terms of social construction, based on social costs and
benefits, that I shall examine the self-help rule of capture and
the competition it sets up between two or more parties with
conflicting interests in the same resource. I am particularly
interested in the kinds of self-help interference with capture
that might or might not be privileged.
A. Interference with Capture
Interference with capture can take essentially two forms. In
the first form, earnest A is trying to get some common property
resource when opportunistic B comes along and grabs the re-
source before A has reduced it to possession and control. So, for
example, a hunter might kill and take a deer that another
hunter was pursuing and was about to shoot at close range.
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The second form of interference is a modest but significant
variation on the first. Here altruistic B interferes with A not by
capturing the resource, but instead by intervening in a way
intended to frustrate capture by A or anyone else. Examples of
particular interest in this essay are provided by zealous envi-
ronmental groups whose members engage in various practices
designed to counter the efforts of hunters attempting to kill or
capture prey. Some of the practices are (usually) uncontentious,
as where environmental activists buy hunting licenses from a
limited stock established by the state and then do not use
them; s or where the groups persuade private landowners to
post their land ("No Hunting!"). 9 But a host of other tactics
have provoked considerable controversy, to the point that many
have been outlawed by legislative action in the form of so-called
hunter harassment laws.2" Typically these laws aim at various
on-site activities by the anti-hunters, such as getting in be-
tween hunters and their prey, making loud noises or scattering
repellents to scare away wildlife, spreading garlic cloves to
throw hunting dogs off the scent, scuba diving in wetsuits to
remove fish from hooks, blocking access to hunting grounds,
and so on."
Over eighty percent of the states have enacted hunter harass-
ment laws, some of which have been upheld by the courts, and
others of which have been invalidated for vagueness, or for
interference with the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech." I want to consider hunter harassment from another
angle, looking at the matter not in terms of the Constitution,
but instead in light of two very old common-law cases.
18. See, e.g., INGRID NEWKIRK, SAVE THE ANIMALS: 101 EASY THINGS YOU CAN Do
96 (1991); Luke A. Dommer, The Anatomy of Hunt Sabotage, ANIMALS' VOICE MAG.,
Aug. 1990, at 70.
19. See, e.g., RON BAKER, THE AMERICAN HUNTING MYTH 58 (1985).
20. On hunter harassment and hunter harassment laws, see generally John A.
Grafton, Hunter Harassment Statutes: Do They Shoot Holes Into the First Amend-
ment?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 191 (1993); Aileen M. Ugalde, The Right to Ann Bears:
Activists' Protests Against Hunting, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1109 (1991); Michael
Satchell, The American Hunter Under Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 1990,
at 30.
21. See generally Stephen F. Ross, Memorandum on Hunter Harassment (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
22. See generally id.
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B. Two Old Cases
Most students of property law have probably been introduced
to the two cases I have in mind, or at least to the first
one-Pierson v. Post.23 Post, who was out hunting on a piece of
open land in the state of New York, had scared up a fox and
was chasing after it with his hounds when Pierson, well aware
that Post was in hot pursuit, killed the animal and took it for
himself. Post sued, and lost on the ground that mere pursuit of
an animal ferae naturae establishes no rights in the hunter; the
animal belongs to the first person who traps, kills, or mortally
wounds it.24 In short, the rule of capture was the applicable
rule of law, a point that the majority determined primarily by
consulting-and on occasion quoting in Latin-works of juris-
prudence that dated back as far as the thirteenth century.
The dissenting judge in Pierson took a seemingly more mod-
ern and constructive approach to the dispute, which he said
"should have been submitted to the arbitration of sportsmen,
without poring over Justinian, Fleta, Bracton, Puffendorf,
Locke, Barbeyrac, or Blackstone, all of whom have been cit-
ed. . . ."' The judge observed that the chief point of a fox
hunt was to rid the land of the fox, whose "depredations on
farmers and on barn yards, have not been forgotten; and to put
him to death wherever found, is allowed to be meritorious, and
of public benefit."26 But who would bother hunting foxes in the
first place if "a saucy intruder, who had not shared in the
honours or labours of the chase, were permitted to come in at
the death, and bear away in triumph the object of pursuit?"27
The way to get rid of foxes was to get rid of the rule of cap-
ture. A hunter should prevail if "he be within reach, or have a
reasonable prospect ... of taking, what he has thus discovered
[with] an intention of converting to his own use.""
23. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). This case has been a standard item in
American property law casebooks for many years.
24. See id. at 179.
25. Id. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 181.
28. Id. at 182 (emphasis deleted).
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The majority, as we have seen, disagreed, figuring that while
the rule of capture did tolerate the admittedly rude behavior of
a person like Pierson, it had the offsetting advantage of easy
application (it is simpler to determine capture than to deter-
mine a reasonable prospect of capture).29 What the majority
did not address is the impact of the rule of capture on the
destiny of foxes. That issue we can take up later for ourselves.
The second case I want to consider, Keeble v. Hickeringill,3
was decided a century before Pierson, and by an English, not
an American, court. Actually, the decision in Keeble was cited
by the majority opinion in Pierson, though not by name and not
as precedent; it was regarded as "clearly distinguishable."31
Keeble, like Pierson, involved interference with capture, but
in the second of its two forms, where the interloper acts not to
finish the business at hand but rather to frustrate it. Keeble
owned some land on which he had built a pond (called a decoy)
to attract ducks that he would then catch with nets.
Hickeringill, an eccentric parson who lived nearby, was unhap-
py about his neighbor's activities. He discharged guns to scare
the fowl away from Keeble's decoy, and Keeble sued for damag-
es. Chief Justice Holt, one of the great English judges, wrote an
opinion in Keeble's favor. The whole of the opinion is very brief,
and the little bit quoted here is its gist:
To learn the trade of seducing ... ducks to come . .. in
order to be taken is not prohibited either by the law of the
land or the moral law; but it is as useful to use art to se-
duce them, to catch them, and destroy them for the use of
mankind, as to kill and destroy wildfowl or tame cattle.
Then when a man useth his art or his skill to take
them, . . . this is his trade; and he that hinders another in
his trade or livelihood is liable to an action for so hindering
him....
[W]here a violent or malicious act is done to a man's
occupation, profession, or way of getting a livelihood, there
an action lies in all cases. But if a man doth him damage
29. See id. at 179.
30. 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Y-B. 1707).
31. See 3 Cai. R. at 179 (identifying the case only by one of its citations, and
finding it distinguishable).
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by using the same employment; as if Mr. Hickeringill had
set up another decoy on his own ground near the plaintiffs,
and that had spoiled the custom of the plaintiff, no action
would lie, because he had as much liberty to make and use
a decoy as the plaintiff.32
Holt's concern, expressed at the end of his opinion, was to sup-
port a process "whereby the markets of the nation may be fur-
nished. . ..",
V. Two READINGS OF Two OLD CASES
There are two ways to read Pierson and Keeble, two ways to
get at what they have to say about modern day conflicts be-
tween avid hunters and zealous environmentalists. One reading,
which I think is fairly superficial, quite obviously supports the
position of those opposed to hunter harassment. But the other
reading, which plumbs a little deeper, opens up the possibility
of the opposite conclusion. Consider the two interpretations in
turn.
Pierson, stating a view that reflects what is generally still
the law in the United States, allows anti-hunting activists some
privileges, but at a price the activists cannot afford to pay.
They are only entitled to interfere with hunters in the way that
Pierson was allowed to interfere with Post. They can go and do
likewise, trying to kill or capture the hunters' prey before the
hunters do. But killing, obviously, is out of the question for the
zealous environmentalists. So is catching (say by nets), because
the activists' objective for wildlife is conservation, not confine-
ment. Caging the animals is ruled out by principle, and would
be ruled out by cost in any event, no matter how much cheaper
it would be than another infeasible alternative-buying up land
for huge game preserves.
What the activists need is the privilege to scare wildlife away
from hunters, or hunters away from wildlife, but such measures
seem to be denied them by Keeble, and Keeble, like Pierson, is
the law (indeed, it is the very law since codified in hunter ha-
32. 11 East at 575-76, 103 Eng. Rep. at 1128.
33. 11 East at 578, 103 Eng. Rep. at 1129.
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rassment legislation). The two cases establish a catch-as-catch-
can regime. Interference with capture is allowed, but only when
it is a kind of interference that promotes capture in the end. So
Pierson was allowed to snatch the prey away from Post at the
last moment, but would not have been privileged to foil the fox
hunt altogether. Similarly, Hickeringill was not allowed to scare
the ducks on Keeble's pond away, but was privileged to attract
them to his own decoy. The cases are of a piece.
Interestingly enough, however, they are of a piece on a deep-
er reading as well, but the deeper reading carries a very differ-
ent message. While Pierson and Keeble are both about promot-
ing capture, they are also, and more fundamentally, both about
advancing social welfare. In neither case, after all, did the judg-
es wish to promote capture just for its own sake; in both, they
wanted to do so in order to make society better off, given condi-
tions at the time.
VI. PRODUCTIVE INTERFERENCE AS HEALTHY COMPETITION
To me it is plain that the judges in Pierson v. Post and
Keeble v. Hickeringill were constructing a self-help regime, and
not in some mindless or formalistic (or inconsistent) fashion but
rather very sensibly. Confronted with parties who were interfer-
ing with each other in various ways, they aimed at resolutions
that produced net benefits for society, given the conditions then
present.34 In the time of those cases, the social benefits of con-
suming chickens and ducks outweighed, or at least were surely
thought to outweigh, the benefits of conserving abundant wild-
life. So while some kinds of interference with capture were
privileged and other kinds prohibited, the constant aim was to
make society better off by facilitating consumption. Hickeringill
couldn't interfere with Keeble in a way that meant fewer ducks,
but Pierson could interfere with Post in a way that meant few-
er foxes (and more chickens); Hickeringill would have been
allowed to catch any ducks he could lure from Keeble's pond to
34. See Posner, supra note 3, at 223 (suggesting that the chief purpose of self-
help privileges and prohibitions should be "to channel people's conduct, and in such a
way that the value of interfering activities is maximized.")
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his own, but Pierson would not have been allowed to trip Post
so that the fox could get away.
In a state of abundance-whether abundant wildlife, ground-
water, oil, gas, or any other fugitive resource-the balance of
costs and benefits makes exploitation sensible,35 and the rule
of capture as fashioned by the courts promoted exactly that.
The dissenting judge in Pierson was incorrect. The dissent,
remember, expressed the view that the majority's rule of cap-
ture would discourage hunting.36 The logic of the judge's argu-
ment is apparent:
* P1 hunts because he likes the thrill of killing foxes.
* P2 also hunts, for the same reason.
* If either hunter can at the last instant lose a good-as-dead
fox to the opportunistic other hunter, no hunters will bother
hunting.
* Conclusion: a chickenless world overrun with foxes.
There are several problems with this reasoning. The first
might be called a Yogi Berra-type problem (Berra is alleged to
have said that nobody ate at a certain restaurant, because it
was too crowded): If a prospective hunter can observe that no
hunters are hunting, won't he enter the empty field? The sec-
ond problem with the dissent's reasoning relates to this, and
gets to the real substance of the matter. One might think that
no hunter will enter the empty field because each knows that
other opportunistic hunters would then follow him and take
advantage of his labors. Perhaps, but the first entrant would
still have a lead-time advantage; he might be able to chase up
and kill a fox before anybody else arrives. Given this, hunters
generally would have incentives to concentrate on making
quicker kills, for example by using long-range rifles, or faster
horses, or both. In consequence, more foxes would be killed-by
somebody or other.
35. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONAL R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONmEN-
TALISM 40-45 (1991) (discussing the costs of exploitation versus conservation of timber
in the nineteenth century and suggesting that practices viewed as wasteful today
were productive in their time).
36. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Theory and fact alike suggest that the problems with the
dissent's reasoning in Pierson are not fanciful but real. The rule
of capture favored by the majority has been shown in any num-
ber of instances to result in relatively rapid depletion rather
than long-term conservation, because it induces people who
seek to exploit common property resources to gear up, to get
more, and to get it faster.37 Put another way, it promotes in-
terference by each in the activities of others. When the interfer-
ence is inconsistent with social welfare, we say it is illegal. But
when it is productive, we call it competition.
A last little bit from Keeble makes my point about construc-
tive interference (competition) ever so clear:
One schoolmaster sets up a new school to the damage of an
ancient school, and thereby the scholars are allured from
the old school to his new. (The action was held there not to
lie.) But suppose Mr. Hickeringill should lie in the way
with his guns, and fright the boys from going to school, and
their parents would not let them go thither; sure that
schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his
scholars."
VII. RETHINKING CAPTURE AND COUNTERACTION
Times are not what they used to be. Fugitive resources that
were once in rich supply have grown scarce, thanks in part to
the rule of capture. Changes in the relative benefits of exploita-
tion and conservation have prompted any number of familiar
measures enacted to economize on dwindling stocks by conserv-
ing rather than consuming. Fossil fuel mining is regulated, as
is extraction of groundwater; threatened species are protected;
habitat is set aside; hunting and fishing are licensed and con-
trolled. So should hunter harassment be allowed?
In considering this question, I limit my inquiry to the kinds
of activist interference that take place on public lands and
waters, that involve common property resources, and that entail
37. See, e.g., Alan E. Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property
Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 UCLA L. REV. 855 (1971).
38. 11 East at 576, 105 Eng. Rep. at 1128.
1052
HeinOnline  -- 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1052 1996
CAPTURE AND COUNTERACTION
no threat to life and limb. I presume that the activists, but for
the disturbance they cause, have as much right as anyone else
to be on lands and waters open to the community in general. I
presume that they "own" wildlife in the same sense as (in com-
mon with) the hunters. And I presume that the activists have
no more right than anyone else to cause physical harm to per-
son or property.39
Given all of this, and in light of the continuing relevance of
the principles deeply embedded in our two old cases, I have to
wonder why anti-hunting activists should not be permitted to
interfere with hunters, subject to the terms and conditions I
have mentioned. If I am correct in thinking that many natural
resources once abundant are now in short supply, and if I am
right in my reading of Pierson and Keeble, then those two cases
are venerable precedents in direct support of my position. The
sort of social calculus they suggest is a constant, but the costs
and benefits have changed. What used to add up one way now
adds up another.
Legislators in the United States should rethink hunter ha-
rassment legislation. The international community should be
more tolerant of the activities of groups, like Greenpeace and
the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, that patrol the ocean
commons for the sake of protecting whales and baby seals.0
Judges should be sensitive to the larger social welfare as they
construe hunter harassment legislation or as they decide cases
in the absence of such legislation. A standard canon of statuto-
ry interpretation holds that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law are to be strictly construed,4 and Pierson and Keeble
39. They would thus have the rights to do harm that anyone else has, and it
follows from this that there might be circumstances where they would be privileged
to threaten harm. I do not pursue this observation here. See generally Posner, supra
note 3.
40. On the tactics and legal problems of such groups, see PAUL WATSON, OCEAN
WARRIOR: MY BATTLE TO END THE ILLEGAL SLAUGHTER ON THE HIGH SEAS (1994);
PAUL WATSON, EARTHFORCE! AN EARTH WARRIORS GUIDE TO STRATEGY (1993); Donna
E. Correll, No Peace for the Greens: The Criminal Prosecution of Environmental Activ-
ists and the Threat of Organizational Liability, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 773 (1993).
Some of the activities discussed in the foregoing sources entail very aggressive
acts that violate the restrictions I would put on self-help by environmental activists. I
am interested for now only in acts that pose no unreasonable threat to person or
property.
41. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 62-63 (1982).
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stand for common law principles that, when rightly understood,
endorse not unrestricted capture but constructive competition.
I am not concerned that legitimating hunter harassment is
beyond the courts' competence or authority. Much of the law of
self-help in the United States has been constructed by judges,
who have felt free to grant and deny privileges as circumstanc-
es demanded. The law of landlord and tenant provides a perfect
example. There was a time when landlords were allowed in
many respects to help themselves-say by evicting tenants
without resort to the legal system, or by denying tenants decent
housing conditions-but eventually the old rules were changed,
and almost always by the courts in the first instance (legisla-
tures usually followed suit a little later, codifying the new rules
handed down by the judges).42 Today, for instance, landlords
may not engage in self-help eviction, and most tenants are
entitled to habitable premises and are privileged to enforce the
entitlement on their own by withholding rental payments.43
I am also not concerned that by privileging such self-help
activities as hunter harassment we run the danger of creating a
kind of "noise," whereby activists who suddenly find themselves
entitled to do one thing (such as yell at a hunt) will get con-
fused and think that the new privilege allows them as well to
do some other thing (like hitting a hunter over the head). As
we saw earlier, all sorts of self-help activities are privileged in
the United States, yet our system of social controls has not
fallen apart in consequence. We needn't worry that altering the
rule of capture will undermine the rule of law.
To privilege hunter harassment is not to promote violence,
and testy situations can as well be controlled in any event by
restrictions governing hunters and activists alike. Confronta-
tions are two-sided affairs, and self-restraint by one side is as
much an issue as is self-help by the other.
42. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 6, at 489-97 (self-help eviction by
landlords), 533-37 (tenants' rights to habitable dwellings and rent withholding).
43. See, e.g., id.
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